Within the affiliated private-values paradigm, we develop a tractable empirical model of equilibrium behaviour at first-price, sealed-bid auctions that admits a general dependence structure. The model is nonparametrically identified, but estimating the primitives is plagued by the curse of dimensionality when the number of bidders is even modestly large, so we develop a semiparametric estimation strategy, focusing on the Archimedean family of copulas and implementing this framework using a particular member-the Frank copula. We apply our framework to data from low-price, sealedbid auctions used by the Michigan Department of Transportation to procure roadresurfacing services, rejecting the hypothesis of independence and finding significantly positive (and high) dependence in cost signals.
Motivation and Introduction
During the last five decades, economists have made considerable progress in understanding the theoretical structure of strategic behaviour under market mechanisms, such as auctions, when the number of potential participants is modest; see Krishna (2002) for a comprehensive presentation and evaluation of progress.
One analytic device, commonly used to describe bidder motivation at singleobject auctions, is a continuous random variable which represents individual-specific heterogeneity in valuations. The conceptual experiment involves each potential bidder's receiving an independent draw from a distribution of valuations. Conditional on his draw, a bidder is then assumed to act purposefully, maximizing either the expected profit or the expected utility of profit from winning the auction. Another, frequently-made assumption is that the bidders are ex ante symmetric, their independent draws coming from the same distribution of valuations; this is often referred to as the symmetric independent private-values paradigm (symmetric IPVP). Under this assumption, the researcher can then focus on a representative agent's decision rule when describing equilibrium behaviour.
At many real-world auctions, the latent valuations of potential bidders are related, affiliated is the technical term often used to characterize this dependence. Affiliation was introduced into the theoretical literature concerning auctions by Milgrom and Weber (1982) . In non-technical terms, two random variables are affiliated if high (low) values of each are more likely to occur than high and low or low and high values. Affiliation is related to the notion of concordance which exists in the statistics literature; see, for example, Nelsen (1999) for an introductory discussion on nonlinear forms of dependence, in general, and copulas, in particular. Affiliation is a generalization of the notion of linear correlation, a measure commonly-used by empirical workers.
Investigating equilibrium behaviour at auctions, empirically, when latent valuations are affiliated has challenged researchers for some time. Laffont and Vuong (1996) have pointed out that, when affiliation is present, identification is impossible to establish in many models. Athey and Haile (2002) have described some conditions under which identification is feasible in models containing affiliated values.
Most structural econometric research devoted to investigating equilibrium behaviour at auctions has involved single-object auctions within the symmetric IPVP.
Examples include Paarsch (1992 Paarsch ( ,1997 ; Donald and Paarsch (1993 ; Laffont, Ossard, and Vuong (1995) ; Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) , hereafter GPV, for short; Haile and Tamer (2003); and Li (2005) . Only recently have researchers begun to investigate multi-unit auctions where affiliation in the ordered values for successive units demanded arises even when the initial draws are independent. In particular, Donald, Paarsch, and Robert (2006) as well as Brendstrup (forthcoming) have investigated sequential, English auctions within the symmetric IPVP, while Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003) have investigated the effects of capacity constraints at sequential, low-price, sealed-bid procurement auctions with symmetric, independent, private costs. Hortaçsu (2002) has investigated share auctions within the symmetric IPVP, while Brendstrup and Paarsch (2005) have investigated sequential, English auctions within the asymmetric IPVP. Brendstrup and Paarsch (forthcoming) have investigated multi-object, sequential, English auctions within the symmetric IPVP where the valuations across objects are potentially affiliated. Paarsch and Hong (2006) have summarized some of the important empirical work in this area.
Only a few researchers have dealt explicitly with models within the affiliated private-values paradigm (APVP). In particular, Li, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) have demonstrated nonparametric identification within the conditional IPVP, a special case of the APVP, while Li, Perrigne, and Vuong (2002) have demonstrated nonparametric identification within the APVP. One of the problems that Li et al. faced when implementing their approach is that nonparametric kernel-smoothed estimators are often slow to converge. In this paper, we investigate the advantages of a semiparametric estimation strategy, specifically one that uses the properties of a particular family of copulas as a dimension-reducing device. We focus our efforts on affiliation within models of first-price, sealed-bid auctions, the most important auction format used in practice, at least in terms of the value of goods and services either sold or procured.
Our paper has six remaining parts. Because the copula is central to our analysis, in the next section, we present a brief review of the theory concerning copulas. Subsequently, in section 3, we introduce a simple model of bidding at first-price, sealed-bid auctions in which affiliation is introduced using the copula as an organizing device, while in section 4, we propose a semiparametric estimator, demonstrating that it is consistent and deriving its asymptotic distribution. In section 5, we investigate the small-sample properties of our estimator using Monte Carlo methods, while in section 6, we apply our methods in an empirical investigation of low-price, sealed-bid, procurement-contract auctions held by the Department of Transportation in the State of Michigan. We summarize and conclude in section 7, the final section of the paper. In an appendix, we document the creation of the data set used as well as collect the lemmata and their proofs which are too cumbersome and detailed to include in the text of the paper.
Some Results concerning Copulas
The main analytic device we use to organize our analysis is the copula. Nelsen (1999) has provided a detailed introduction to the theory of copulas; here, we repeat some basic facts which are relevant to our later work. In what follows, for expositional reasons, we restrict our discussion to bivariate copulas, but the results generalize to the case of n variables easily. For two variables, U 1 and U 2 , a bivariate copula C(u 1 , u 2 ) is a continuous function having the following properties:
3. C(u 1 , 1) = u 1 and C(1, u 2 ) = u 2 ; 4. C is a twice-increasing function, so
Because U 1 and U 2 are both defined on the unit interval, they can be viewed as uniform random variables with C(u 1 , u 2 ) being their joint distribution function. Alternatively, U 1 and U 2 can be viewed as the cumulative distribution functions of two random variables V 1 and V 2 which are collected in the vector V . In this case, their marginal distribution functions F 1 (v 1 ) and F 2 (v 2 ) are linked to their joint distribution
One attractive feature of copulas is that the marginal cumulative distribution functions do not depend on the choice of the dependence function for the two random variables in question. When one is interested in the association between random variables, copulas are a useful device because the dependence structure is easily separated from the marginal cumulative distribution functions. From Sklar's Theorem, we know that a unique function C, the copula, exists such that
When V 1 and V 2 are independent, the copula C(·) is trivial as
Also, if we introduce the copulas
then the following inequalities hold:
which are known as the Fréchet-Hoeffding bounds.
Different families of copulas exist. For example, perhaps the best known family is the Gaussian family in which the dependence is completely determined by the correlation coefficient ρ. Thus, the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal bivariate distribution with correlation coefficient ρ is
while the joint probability density function is
where
A simple, and commonly-used, family of copulas that admits non-linear dependence is the Archimedean family, which is uniquely characterized by its generator function ζ(·) where
Here, ζ(·) is a convex, decreasing function. Note, too, that ζ(1) must equal zero and ζ −1 (u) must be zero for any u exceeding ζ(0). These conditions are both necessary and sufficient for C ζ to be a distribution function. Copulas within the Archimedean family have the following bivariate joint density function, which generalizes naturally to n-variates:
A commonly-used member of the Archimedean family of copulas is the Frank copula, which has the following generator function:
and inverse-generator function
The Frank copula has the following n-variate form:
In numerical analysis, it is sometimes useful to employ the following tranformation:
Under this parameterization, the Frank copula can be written as 
What interpretation can be given to the dependence parameter α (or θ)? In the bivariate case, the larger is the value of α (the closer θ is to zero), the greater the positive association. On the other hand, a very negative value of α (a large value of θ) indicates negative association. Independence obtains when α approaches zero or θ approaches one. Note that, when n exceeds two, α is restricted to be positive because a negative α would mean a non-monotonic inverse-generator function of the Frank copula; see example 4.22 in Nelsen (1999, p. 123) .
Other facts concerning oft-used members of the Archimedean family of copulas are collected in table 2.1 along with facts concerning the Frank copulas for the purposes of comparison.
First-Price, Sealed-Bid Auction Model with Affiliation
We consider a model in which each of n(≥ 3) potential bidders draws a valuation V from the joint distribution F V (v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n ) where F i (v i ) denotes the marginal cumulative distribution function of bidder i. We collect the valuations in the (n × 1)-vector V , a realization of which is denoted v. Now, by Sklars' theorem, there exists a copula C such that
Consider the case where F i (·) is the same for all bidders and equals F 0 (·); this is the symmetric APVP. Then
The following lemma is key to our derivation of the equilibrium bid function:
Lemma 1: Assume that F V (v 1 , . . . , v n ) is a symmetric distribution that can be expressed as
where C is a copula and
..v n |v 1 ) can be expressed as
where C 1 is the partial derivative of C with respect to the first component.
Proof:
Differentiating both sides of the last equality with respect to v 1 yields
Thus,
But the left-hand side of (3.2) is just
..v n |v 1 ), so the desired result follows.
Note that our assumption of symmetry is really unnecessary for the proof; we use it to simplify notation as we shall only investigate the symmetric APVP in our empirical work below.
Equilibrium Bidding
Within the symmetric APVP, we can consider the behaviour of any bidder so, without loss of generality, we focus on bidder 1 who is assumed to maximize his expected profit
by choice of bidding strategy s 1 , where σ(·) denotes the strictly increasing bidding strategy and where the second equality follows from Lemma 1. Under symmetry and after some algebra, the first-order condition yields
Introducing G 0 (·) to denote the marginal distribution of equilibrium bids and g 0 (·) to denote its corresponding probability density function, we can apply the GPV approach which involves noting that
Thus, re-arranging terms of the first-order condition in equation (3.3) yields
A Semiparametric Estimator
We frame the intuition behind our estimation strategy in terms of the previous literature and then, subsequently, demonstrate parameter consistency and asymptotic normality of our estimator later in this section. Consider a sample of T auctions at which no reserve price exists, so issues of participation can be safely ignored. In this case, each of the n participants has tendered a bid at the T auctions, so given the following data:
, one can nonparametrically estimate G 0 (s) and g 0 (s) using the methods proposed by GPV. Denote these estimates byG 0 (s) andg 0 (s). From these, again using the sample data, one can then estimate C[F 0 (v 1 ), . . . , F 0 (v n )] using standard methods for copulas; see, for example, Nelsen (1999) as well as Brendstrup and Paarsch (forthcoming) . Based on these, one can then form the pseudo-values according tõ
.
Of course, if n is at all large, then a nonparametric estimator of the copula C(·) may be slow to converge. Thus, we advocate using semiparametric methods. In particular, one can still estimate both G 0 (s) and g 0 (s) nonparametrically, but now put some structure on the copula C(·); e.g., suppose the C(·) is a member of the Archimedean family which is uniquely characterized by the generator function ζ(·).
One flexible way of estimating the generating function ζ(·) would involve introducing a family of shape-preserving polynomials. One would then estimate the coefficients of these polynomials. The estimation strategy would involve allowing the number of terms in the polynomials to increase as the sample size increased, but at a rate which is slower than that of the sample size. Sieve estimation is an example of such a method; see, for example, Chen and Shen (1998) .
Alternatively, consider a family of copulas that is known up to some finite dimensional parameter vector θ, so C(·; θ). A number of members of the Archimedean family have simple parametric representations. When the true copula C 0 (·) belongs to a parametric family C = {C θ , θ ∈ Θ} defined by the vector θ, then a parameter-consistent and asymptotically-normal estimator of θ 0 , the true value, can be obtained by applying the method of maximum likelihood.
Thus, we estimate G 0 0 (s), the marginal cumulative distribution function of S usingG
Here, [1/(nT +1)] is used to scale the cumulative sum in the definition of the empirical distribution function to avoid boundary problems encountered when implementing the copulas. Subsequently, we insertG 0 (·) into the logarithm of the likelihood function and maximize with respect to the parameter θ. BecauseG 0 (·) is different from the true population cumulative distribution function G 0 0 (·), we refer to this method as pseudo maximum-likelihood estimation.
Some Monte Carlo Results
Below, we describe a small-scale Monte Carlo experiment used to investigate the small-sample properties of our estimation strategy. In the tradition of the theoretical literature concerning auctions, our model of bidding in section 3 was developed in terms of valuations for an object to be sold at auction under the first-price, sealedbid format. A majority of sealed-bid auctions involve procurement; i.e., low-price, sealed-bid auctions at which a buyer (often a government agency) seeks to find the lowest-cost producer of some good or service. Because our empirical example in section 6 involves investigating procurement of road resurfacing by a government agency, our simulation study is couched in terms a procurement auction. For the case of low-price, sealed-bid procurement auctions, we collect additional lemmata and their proofs in an appendix to this paper.
In all of the experiments, the simulated data involved a truncated Pareto random variable C (for costs) having the following marginal cumulative distribution function:
We considered the Frank copula, which is a member of the Archimedean family of copulas described in section 2 by equations (2.1), (2.2), (2.3), and (2.4).
Under the parameterization of the Frank copula given in equation (2.5), the partial derivative with respect to u i is
and the cross-partial derivative with respect to u i , and then with respect to u j is
3)
The joint density associated with the trivariate Frank copula is
(5.4) under the parameterization given in equation (2.5) and
under the parametrization given in equation (2.4).
Performance using Independent Data
Our simulation study involved samples of size T equal one hundred with n of three bidders; each sample was replicated 1, 000 times. The lower bound of support, the lowest cost c, was one, while the upper bound of support, the highest cost c, was three. The parameters of the Pareto distribution were γ 0 equal one and γ 1 equal two. To convert the i th uniform draw u i from U (0, 1) into a draw from the truncated Pareto distribution c i , we simply inverted the cumulative distribution according to the following formula:
In the case of independence, simulated costs c i were then mapped into simulated bids b i using the symmetric equilibrium bid function
where F 0 (·) is the truncated Pareto distribution specified in equation (5.1) and the integral was computed numerically using a quadrature routine. We then used the approach of GPV to estimate G 0 (b) and g 0 (b) nonparametrically using the following estimators:G
Again, the division by (nT + 1) rather than (nT ) is a rescaling to avoid numerical complications arising at the boundary of the copula; e.g., recall from section 2 above, that C(1, u 2 ) equals u 2 and C(u 1 , 1) equals u 1 . We employed the triweight kernel
with bandwidth
(nT + 1)
where d equal 2.978 is the bandwidth transformation constant from Härdle (1991) and σ was the standard deviation of b which is the vector collecting the data {{b it } n i=1 } T t=1 . We then estimated θ by the method of pseudo maximum-likelihood using the following logarithm of the likelihood function: Usingθ as well asG 0 (b) andg 0 (b) from equations (5.6) and (5.7), we then computed an estimate of the survival copula according tõ
where S 1 (·) was obtained from
with u 1 and u 2 and u 3 all equalling [1 −G 0 (b i )] when we were interested in recovering the pseudo-costc i associated with bid b i . We also computed
where S 12 (·) was obtained from
(5.9) with u 1 and u 2 and u 3 again equalling [1 −G 0 (b i )] when we were interested in recovering the pseudo-costc i associated with bid b i . We then used ourg 0 (b) from equation (5.7) in conjunction withS 1 (b) from equation (5.8) andS 12 (b) from equation (5.9) to compute the pseudo-cost associated with any bid b
To account for biases, near the boundaries, that obtain because we kernel-smoothed the density, we only used the bid function in the prior step to recover the cost if the observed bid is in the range [b + h, b − h] where b was min {b it } and b was max {b it }.
In table 5.1, we present summary statistics concerning theθs we estimated over 1, 000 simulations under the assumption of independence. An optimal solution was found forθ in all simulations; this was verified manually. By and large, the pseudo maximum-likelihood estimator does quite well given such small samples: a bias of less than ten percent obtains because we constrain θ to be between zero and one.
In figures 5.1-5.3, we present the mean bid function, the median bid function, and a ninety-percent confidence interval constructed using the fifth and ninety-fifty percentiles of the estimated pseudo-costs. The results show that we are doing a good job of matching the analytic bid function. In figures 5.4-5.7, we replicate these figures, but also include the results from doing the same exercise using the approach of GPV. These results show that the GPV approach also does well at tracking the analytic bid function in the case of independent and identically-distributed data.
Performance using Dependent Data
To simulate data from a Frank copula with dependence, we followed the approach described by Cherubini, Luciano, and Vecchiato (2004) . Theirs involves conditional sampling where, initially, v 1 , a U (0, 1) random draw is taken and then u 1 is set equal to it. The next (dependent) draw is taken from C 2 (v 2 |u 1 ), and so on, so that u n is drawn from C n (v n |u 1 , . . . , u n−1 ) where all the v i s are independent U (0, 1) draws.
Below, we describe the algorithm to implement conditional sampling using the paramaterization of the Frank copula given in equation (2.4) in conjunction with the generator function defined in equation (2.2) and the inverse-generator function defined in equation (2.3). Specifically, to generate dependent draws (u 1 , u 2 , u 3 ) from the trivariate Frank copula, we did the following:
1. simulate the independent random variables (v 1 , v 2 , v 3 ) from U (0, 1); 2. set u 1 equal to v 1 ; 3. set v 2 equal to C 2 (u 2 |u 1 ) which yields
4. set v 3 equal to C 3 (u 3 |u 1 , u 2 ) which yields the following polynomial equation of order two in the variable [exp(−αu 3 ) − 1]:
which must be solved for u 3 .
The above algorithm yields three dependent random draws from the trivariate Frank copula for one simulation draw; this procedure was repeated 100 times for each of 1, 000 replications. In figure 5 .7, we present a plot of all the points for one replication generated when α is 0.01. (Remember an α of zero is the case of independence.) Note that the scatter plot looks uniform. In figure 5 .8, we present a plot of all the points for one replication generated when α is 20 which means there is strong positive dependence, as illustrated in the figure.
In Table 5 .2, we present summary statistics concerning the pseudo maximumlikelihood estimator of the dependence parameter. In the first two columns, we present the true values of the dependence parameter α 0 and its transformation θ 0 . The last five columns tabulate the means, standard deviations, and medians as well as the minima and maxima.
An Empirical Application
To illustrate the feasibility of our estimation strategy, we have chosen to implement it using data from low-price, sealed-bid, procurement auctions held by the Department of Transportation (DOT) in the State of Michigan. At these auctions, qualified firms are invited to bid on jobs that involve resurfacing roads in Michigan. We have chosen this type of auction because the task at hand is quite well-understood. In addition, there are reasons to believe that firm-specific characteristics make the private-cost paradigm a reasonable assumption; e.g., managerial ability at specific firms can differ considerably. On the other hand, other factors suggest that the cost signals of individual bidders could be dependent; e.g., these firms hire labour services in the same market and face similar costs for inputs such as energy as well as paving inputs. Thus, the affiliated private-cost paradigm (APCP) seems reasonable. We have eschewed investigating issues relating to asymmetries across bidders (i.e., introducing F i s that vary across bidders) because we have insufficient data to identify such models. Instead, we focus on the symmetric APCP outlined above and developed further in the first section of the appendix to this paper. As no reserve price exists at these auctions, we treat the number of participants as if it were the number of potential bidders and focus on auctions at which three bidders participated.
In table 6.1, we present the summary descriptive statistics concerning our sample of 834 observations concerning 278 auctions. Our bid variable is the price per mile. In figure 6 .1, we presentG 0 (b|x) where x is the engineer's estimate, per mile, using those data for which n is three, while in figure 6.2, we presentg 0 (b|x), evaluated at the sample median of x. Applying the methods of GPV, in figure 6 .3, we presentf 0 (c|x), an estimate of the true population probability density function f 0 0 (c|x), assuming independence, evaluated at the sample median of x. Applying our estimation strategy, the pseudo maximum-likeihood estimateα is 11.2895, suggesting considerable positive dependence. In figure 6 .3, we also depictf 0 (c|x), an estimate of f 0 0 (c|x) admitting affiliation, evaluated at the sample median of x. The pseudo-ML estimate of f 0 0 (c|x) is much more concentrated than that of GPV.
In figure 6 .4, we present the bid function (pseudo-costs) predicted by our approach. Notice how our estimates are very close to the 45 • -line. In figure 6 .5, we plot our pseudo-cost estimates versus those derived using the methods of GPV. One of the pseudo-costs predicted by GPV was negative, while no negative costs were predicted using our approach. The main point, however, is that the GPV pseudo-costs are systematically above our PML estimates. To give the reader some notion concerning the importance of affiliation, we illustrate in figure 6.6 the positive dependence in pseudo-ML estimates of cost signals.
Subsequently, as a potential specification check, we re-estimated the dependence parameter α 0 using our pseudo-cost estimates, the notion being that a monotonic transformation will preserve the dependence parameter in a correctly-specified model. Trimming eliminated 268 observations and our pseudo-MLE of α 0 is 8.4214. When we re-estimated the dependence parameter using bids, eliminating those bids whose pseudo-costs were trimmed, our pseudo-MLE of α 0 is 8.5487, which is remarkably close, and suggestive that the model is not mis-specified.
Why is affiliation potentially interesting to an economist? In figure 6 .7, we illustrate that, in the presence of positive affiliation, low-cost bidders (those who are likely to win the auction) behave more competitively than would be predicted under independence. In fact, even with just three bidders, the winners (those with low costs) are bidding very close to their costs.
Summary and Conclusions
Within the affiliated private-values paradigm, we have developed a tractable empirical model of equilibrium behaviour at first-price, sealed-bid auctions that admits a general dependence structure. While the model is nonparametrically identified, estimating the primitives is plagued by the curse of dimensionality, particularly when the number of bidders is relatively large (e.g., four or more), so we have developed a semiparametric estimation strategy, focusing our attention on the Archimedean family of copulas and implementing this framework using a particular member-the Frank cop- Pr (C 1 ≥ c 1 , . . . , C n ≥ c n ) = Pr (C 1 ≥ c 1 , . . . , C n−1 ≥ c n−1 )− Pr (C 1 ≥ c 1 , . . . , C n−1 ≥ c n−1 , C n < c n )
Note that this lemma gives a copula representation of the survival copula, which is useful in the characterization of the first-order condition of the equilibrium bid at a procurement auction. The lemma is a generalization of the case for n of two given by Nelsen (1998, p. 28) . We introduce the notation S to denote the survival copula and define a survival copula as
where F i (·) denotes the cumulative distribution function of variable C i .
Lemma 3:
where S 1 denotes the partial derivative of S with respect to the first component.
Proof: Let f C (c 1 , . . . , c n ) denote the probability density function corresponding to 
A.2. Auction Data
The data for the empirical part of this paper, which concern procurement contracts for road resurfacing, were provided in raw form by the Department of Transportation (DOT) of the State of Michigan. To create the final data set, we first extracted contract length and determined the number of bidders at each auction. Next, we looked for observations having missing data, scanning each file to ensure that all contract lengths were properly extracted. Finally, we checked to ensure that all data were in the same units; e.g., we converted contracts that were measured in kilometres into miles. At this point, we had 4, 200 bid observations concerning 1, 041 contracts. Subsequently, we focused on auctions having n of three; this constrained us to 278 auctions.
